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CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 
UNIVERSAL STANDING FOR THE UNINJURED 
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL? 
Peter A. Alpert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 1988 was accompanied by conditions-drought, 
forest fire, heat wave, medical waste-that accomplished what no 
politician, professor, or public interest group had managed to accom-
plish in twenty years of publicity about and debate over the future 
of the world's environment: they focused public attention on the 
widespread and intractable nature of the planet's environmental 
problems. One of the most pervasive fears-that the planet was 
warming as a result of the so-called "Greenhouse Effect"-was un-
derscored in the Eastern United States by a persistent and frus-
trating battle with heat, smog and ozone pollution. 1 
Associated with the persistence of these problems was a sentiment 
that the nation had not made sufficient progress in its eighteen year 
attempt under the Federal Air Pollution Control Act ("Clean Air 
Act," "CAA" or "Act")2 to clean up the ambient air.3 In contrast to 
efforts to clean the nation's waters, 4 the achievement of clean air 
loomed as a distant goal that could be reached only at the expense 
* Executive Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Ozone Pollution Is Found at Peak in Summer Heat, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, at 1, col. 
1. 
242 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
3 N. Y. Times, July 31, 1988, at 1, col. 1 ("Instead of progressing toward the goal in the 
clean air law of reducing ozone to safe levels, the country appears to be losing ground."). 
4 Most Sewage Plants Meeting Latest Goal of Clean Water Act, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1988, 
at 1, col. 1 (noting "significant step toward the goal of making the nation's [waters] fishable 
and swimmable again."). 
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of serious economic dislocation. 5 Congress and the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") effectively admitted that air quality 
stan(lards established under the Clean Air Act in the mid-1970's 
were not and could not be met in accordance with established dead-
lines. 6 Meanwhile, as Congress and the EPA concluded that changes 
in the law would be more practicable than efforts to enforce compli-
ance with existing standards, 7 citizens waged battle with the torpid-
ity and morbidity of the smoggy summer. 8 
Citizens, however, are not without power to assist in the effort to 
clean the air .. The Clean Air Act includes a citizen suit provision9 
designed to augment and buttress federal enforcement of existing 
air pollution control legislation. The citizen suit provision-section 
304 of the Act-allows "any person" to bring suit under the Act. 10 
Such suits may be brought against a party in violation of either 
standards promulgated under the Act or of an enforcement order 
issued under the Act. 11 Suits may also be brought against the Ad-
5 See To Live and Breathe in L.A., N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (Los Angeles 
presented with choice between clean air and a vital economy). 
6 In 1987 Congress extended the deadline for cities' compliance with Clean Air Act carbon 
monoxide and ozone standards from December 31, 1987 to August 31, 1988. See 18 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1948 (Dec. 25, 1987). The EPA, in anticipation of "the likely persistence in many urban 
areas of violations of the [National Ambient Air Quality Standards] for ozone and [carbon 
monoxide] beyond ... the latest date for attainment explicitly mentioned in the Act," has 
promulgated regulations governing the revised schedule for compliance. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,044 
(1987). The EPA estimates that 68 major metropolitan areas missed the August 31, 1988 
deadline for ozone compliance. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, at 1, col. 1. 
7 The EPA suggests that it will take enforcement measures against only those metropolitan 
areas that have not made serious efforts to comply with the extended deadline. N.Y. Times, 
July 31, 1988, at 24, col. 1. 
8 See, e.g., Achoo! Pollen's Mischief Begins Before Allergy Season, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 
1988, at 29, col. 2 (attributing allergy-like symptoms to, among other things, increased levels 
of ozone in lower atmosphere). 
942 U.S.C.§ 7604 [hereinafter section 304]. 
10 [d. This section provides in relevant part: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a 
civil action in his own behalf -
(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission 
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the 
Administrator or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation, 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discre-
tionary with the Administrator, or 
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or 
modified major emitting facility without a permit required under ... this 
chapter .... 
[d. § 7604(a)(I). 
II [d. § 7604(a)(l). 
-------------
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ministrator of the EPA 12 for failure to perform non-discretionary 
duties required under the Act. 13 
The use of the term "any person" to define. the class of persons 
entitled to bring suit under the Act ostensibly creates "universal 
standing"14-standing regardless of any interest the plaintiff may 
have in the resolution of the suit. A grant of universal standing, 
however, seems inconsistent with the general doctrine of standing 
as developed under the case and controversy clause of the Consti-
tution. Because of the fundamental relationship between the case 
and controversy clause and the proper role of the federal courts in 
our system of government, a grant of universal standing has impli-
cations for the doctrine of separation of powers. Despite the apparent 
constitutional problems inherent in universal standing, numerous 
federal environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions that 
grant standing to unlimited classes of plaintiffs. 15 
This Comment explores Congress's authority to grant universal 
standing to further a national policy favoring the vigorous enforce-
ment of environmental legislation. In this light, the Comment 
touches upon the general doctrine of standing and its origins in the 
Supreme Court. The Comment then examines the doctrine of stand-
ing as applied to organizational plaintiffs, such as those commonly 
involved in the prosecution of environmental citizen suits. The Com-
ment further examines Congress's ability to extend standing to new 
classes of plaintiffs to vindicate rights and concerns unknown at 
common law. It then reviews the treatment that section 304 of the 
Clean Air Act has received in lower federal courts. Finally, the 
Comment suggests that the power of citizens groups to engage in 
the enforcement of federal environmental legislation is limited by 
constitutional standing rules, no matter how compelling the congres-
sional reason for adopting broad statutory definitions of standing. 
The Comment concludes that, despite its desirability from a policy 
standpoint, section 304 is constitutionally invalid as a grant of uni-
versal standing. This is especially true in respect to the use of section 
12Id. § 7601 (delegates administrative duties to Environmental Protection Agency). 
13 I d. § 7604(a)(2). 
14 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973). 
15 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982) (allows suits by "any 
person"); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (allows suits 
by "any person"); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1982) (allows suits by "any person"); 
Energy Policy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1982) ("any person"); Resource Recovery 
and Reclamation Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("any person"). 
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304 as a means of challenging governmental or administrative con-
duct. 
II. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF STANDING 
The federal judiciary, under article III of the Constitution, is 
limited to hearing only cases and controversies. 16 This vague lan-
guage has resulted in the general theory that federal courts are 
limited to hearing the claims of only those plaintiffs who can allege 
to have suffered or to be threatened with some sort of injury in 
fact,17 resulting from the defendant's conduct,18 which can be re-
dressed by the court. 19 This theory has come to be known as the 
doctrine of standing. 
Standing is, generally stated, the ability to be a plaintiff in a 
lawsuit.20 Standing is premised on the theory that only those who 
have a genuine stake in the outcome of a particular lawsuit should 
be able to participate in the suit. 21 As the Supreme Court commented 
in one recent standing decision, absent the standing requirement 
courts would be threatened with transformation into "debating so-
cieties. "22 Courts in this position would be forced to perform func-
tions inconsistent with their place in a system of separated powers. 23 
In the Supreme Court, the standing doctrine has its origins in 
Frothingham v. Mellon.24 In Frothingham, a federal taxpayer chal-
lenged Congress's decision to allocate federal funds for the assistance 
16 u.s. CONST. art. III, § 2. This provision provides, in relevant part: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between 
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens 
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens and Subjects. 
17 See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
20 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 24:1-24:36 (2d ed. 1982) 
[hereinafter K. DAVIS]. 
21Id. 
22 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 477 (1981) (challenge to gratuitous conveyance of government property to 
sectarian school, made on grounds that conveyance violated the establishment clause, dis-
missed for lack of standing). 
23 See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. 
24 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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of mothers and their newborn infants in the hope of lowering infant 
mortality rates. 25 
The Frothingham Court held that the plaintiff had suffered no 
tangible injury that would confer standing to challenge the expen-
diture.26 Instead, the Court found that the plaintiff's "liability as a 
taxpayer is unaffected by the disposition which Congress . . . may 
make of the public revenues or property. "27 The Court declined to 
adjudicate "abstract questions which do not appreciably or practi-
cally affect" a plaintiff who alleges such minor and unredressable 
harm,28 that is, harm shared "in common with people generally 
"29 
The Supreme Court has since decided over 200 cases involving 
questions of standing. 30 Because of the preponderance of Supreme 
Court opinions, the doctrine has become one of '''the most amorphous 
[concepts] in the entire domain of public law."'31 
A. Standing Bifurcated: Prudential Doctrine and the Article III 
Minima 
The Supreme Court rarely addresses the issue of standing without 
dividing its analysis into two separate, but hardly distinct,32 con-
cepts: standing in the article III or constitutional sense, and standing 
as a "prudential" rule of judicial self-governance. 33 Understanding 
this bifurcation is crucial in considering the permissibility of univer-
sal standing, because Congress can extend standing to new classes 
of plaintiffs by eliminating only prudential barriers to standing. 34 
25 Id. at 479. 
26 Id. at 488-89. 
'l:I Id. at 451. 
28 Id. at 451--52. 
29 Id. at 488. 
30 K. DAVIS, supra note 20, § 24.1, at 208. 
31 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465, 
at 498 (statement of Paul Freund)). 
82 Id. at 96-97 (successful taxpayer challenge to disbursement of federal funds to religious 
and sectarian schools on establishment clause grounds). 
33 E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (standing "subsumes" a combination of constitutional 
requirements and prudential concerns); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (the standing 
inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts and pru-
dentiallimitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction). 
34 See infra notes 139-61 and accompanying text. 
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1. "Prudential" Standing 
Prudential standing is a concept created by the federal courts sua 
sponte, as part of a system of self-imposed limitations on the exercise 
of federal court jurisdiction.35 Prudential standing is not concerned 
primarily with the existence of a justiciable controversy.36 In pru-
dential standing terms, a "controversy" within the meaning of article 
III may exist, but the particular plaintiff may not be the proper 
party to bring suit in the controversy. 37 
As will be seen, "prudential" considerations present no barrier to 
congressional attempts to grant standing to new classes of plain-
tiffs.38 As rules of judicial self-governance, prudential considerations 
are not mandated by the Constitution. 39 They are not related to the 
goal of confining "federal courts to a role consistent with a system 
of separated powers . . . . "40 
Prudential rules are not always clearly distinct from those stand-
ing rules which find their source in the Constitution. 41 Standing is 
ultimately based on more fundamental ground than policy.42 It is 
upon this constitutional ground that Congress may not intrude as it 
35 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1935). In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Brandeis outlined seven rules for the self-governance of the Supreme Court 
in deciding constitutional questions: (1) the Court will not entertain friendly or collusive suits; 
(2) the Court will not pass upon a question before it is ripe for decision; (3) the Court will not 
formulate overly broad constitutional rules; (4) the Court will not dispose of a case on consti-
tutional grounds if alternative, non-constitutional, grounds exist; (5) the Court will not decide 
the constitutionality of a statute unless the plaintiff shows an injury as a result of its 
opemtion; (6) the Court will not hear the complaint of plaintiffs who have availed themselves 
of any benefits conferred by the statute they challenge; and (7) the Court will avoid, when 
alternative constructions permit, holding a statute unconstitutional. Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). The fifth rule relates to standing and is a prudential limitation not only because 
Brandeis labelled it a rule of the Court's "own governance," but more importantly because it 
presupposes the existence of "cases confessedly within [the Court's] jurisdiction." Id. at 346. 
36 An example is afforded by the plaintiff who asserts the rights of others. While a justiciable 
controversy within the meaning of article III may exist, the third party plaintiff is not the 
proper party to invoke the Court's jurisdiction, and is barred by prudential standing rules. 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975) ("the prudential standing rule ... normally bars 
litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others"); see also, Singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 123 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (standing poses 
question of whether "it is prudent to proceed to decision on particular issues even at the 
instance of a party whose Art. III standing is clear"). 
37 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 123. 
38 See infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text. 
39 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1967) (prudential rules "find their source in policy, rather 
than purely constitutional considerations"). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). 
42 See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
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statutorily broadens the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue in federal 
court. 43 
2. Article III, or Constitutional, Standing 
Standing in the constitutional sense has its source in article Ill's 
case or controversy clause,44 which operates to limit the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts. While some uncertainty in the area of standing 
jurisprudence stems from the indistinct boundary between pruden-
tial and constitutional considerations,45 additional problems arise 
from the difficulty of determining what "case or controversy" meant 
to the framers of the Constitution. 46 
Although a precise definition of article Ill's limiting words is not 
ascertainable, the Supreme Court has concluded that the case and 
controversy clause operates to limit the exercise of federal judicial 
power "to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role con-
sistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally 
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. "47 
This emphasis on having courts act in a manner consistent with 
their usual adjudicatory function is "built on a single basic idea-the 
idea of separation of powers. "48 In the absence of a justiciable case 
or controversy a matter is more properly resolved in another forum. 
Thus, the standing requirement, as a function of the separation of 
powers, can serve as a bar to a plaintiff who alleges only a general 
grievance of broad public import. Questions of broad public import 
may be characterized as political questions more worthy of consid-
eration in representative fora. 49 
43 See infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text. 
44 See supra note 16. 
45 Flast, 392 U.S. at 97. 
46 The Flast Court concludes that the "implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not 
history alone" often give needed content to the case and controversy clause. [d. at 95-96. 
47 [d. at 97. 
48 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (suit brought by parents of black schoolchildren 
alleging that failure of Internal Revenue Service to properly implement rules denying tax-
exempt status to schools engaging in racial discrimination encouraged schools to continue 
discriminatory practices). 
49 See id. at 751 (generalized grievances are more appropriately addressed in representative 
branches); see also Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1981) (generalized grievances are most appropriately addressed 
in representative branches); Center For Auto Safety v. National Highway Transportation 
Safety Ass., 793 F.2d 1322, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (that which is of 
interest to "society at large" should be resolved through the political processes by which 
society acts). 
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If application of article III standing barriers results in the absence 
of any eligible plaintiffs, then the evidence is strong that the issue 
is a political one. 50 This line of reasoning is particularly applicable to 
citizen suits that challenge agency action, rather than the activities 
of private actors. 51 In such cases, policy decisions are at issue, not 
discrete violations of, for example, emissions standards promulgated 
under the CAA. Policy is the realm of the representative branches. 52 
Thus, the case or controversy clause "forecloses the conversion"53 
of a federal court into a forum that entertains "generalized griev-
ance[s] about the conduct of government .... "54 
The inexorable nature of article III standing is demonstrated by 
the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]hose who do not possess 
Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the 
United States."55 Despite the fundamental nature of constitutional 
standing, however, it, "like the prudential component ... incorpo-
rates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. "56 
Despite the problems of imprecision inherent in constitutional stand-
ing, the Supreme Court has established an irreducible test for de-
termining whether a plaintiff has article III standing. 
B. Injury in Fact: The Test of Constitutional Standing 
The Supreme Court, in an attempt to give content to the consti-
tutional standing requirement, has concluded that a plaintiff must 
show "injury in fact" to establish article III standing. 57 Injury in fact 
50 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1973) (absence of any plaintiff who 
can meet the threshold standing test lends support to argument that the subject matter is 
properly addressed by Congress and ultimately by political processes); Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1973) (again, in context of lack of eligible 
plaintiffs, this system of government defers many crucial decisions to political processes). 
51 See infra notes 237-69 and accompanying text for discussion of legislative history of 
section 304 (citizen suit a mechanism to encourage government to comply with statutory 
mandate to enforce environmental laws), 
52 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1976) (in a democracy the legislature is the 
appropriate forum for the resolution of policy issues); accord Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
326 (1979). 
53 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. 
54 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1967). 
55 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475-76. 
56 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
57 See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 
(1969) (first question in considering article III standing is whether plaintiff has suffered injury 
in fact); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (plaintiff must 
show "actual or threatened injury" resulting from defendant's putatively illegal conduct). 
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is "an irreducible minimum" below which a plaintiff may not fall and 
still have article III standing. 58 
The source of the injury in fact requirement and its relation to the 
proper functioning of the federal courts in a system of separated 
powers is the case of Baker v. Carr. 59 In Baker, the Court ruled on 
the standing of the plaintiffs to challenge the alleged malapportion-
ment of Tennessee voting districts. 60 Justice Brennan framed the 
standing inquiry in the following terms: "Have the appellants alleged 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of 
difficult ... questions?"61 
Baker v. Carr's requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal 
stake" in a controversy62 has evolved into a requirement of injury in 
fact. 63 In Flast v. Cohen64 the Court, as it had in Frothingham,65 
ruled on whether the plaintiff had standing, as a taxpayer, to chal-
lenge the expenditure of federal funds for objectionable purposes. 66 
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the use of federal funds for 
the support of sectarian schools violated the establishment and free 
exercise clauses of the first amendment. 67 
For the first time since Frothingham, the Court had to conduct a 
"fresh examination"68 of whether taxpayers suffered injury in fact 
sufficient to establish standing if some of their taxes were spent for 
purposes they found objectionable. 69 The Court decided that in cer-
tain limited instances article III standing may be premised on a 
plaintiff's status as a taxpayer.70 In such instances, where the ob-
jectionable expenditure is of such a nature as to be particularly 
58 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. 
59 369 u. S. 186 (1961). 
60 ld. at 187-88. Although malapportionment is concededly a wrong, a challenge to this sort 
of government misconduct is generally not considered justiciable. See infra notes 132-37 and 
accompanying text. 
61 Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
62 ld. 
63 E.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-
52 (1969) (standing related to ability of plaintiff to create adversary context; first inquiry in 
determining standing is whether plaintiff alleges injury in fact). 
64 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
65 262 U.S. 447 (1922). 
66 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85. 
67 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
68 Flast, 392 U.S. at 94. 
69 I d. at 85-86. 
7°ld. at 101. 
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offensive, an injury arises that allows plaintiffs to frame their cases 
with the "necessary adverseness" called for in Baker v. Carr. 71 
The Flast Court related the injury in fact requirement to the 
separation of powers.72 Subsequently, it has become clear that the 
requirement of adverseness or injury in fact is related to the sepa-
ration of powers because, without the requirement, federal courts 
cease to function as courtS. 73 Standing protects the federal courts 
from conversion into "publicly funded forums for the ventilation of 
public grievances .... "74 Plaintiffs lacking injury in fact do not have 
a cognizable interest in the resolution of a case,75 and therefore will 
not be sufficient adversaries to allow the court to function properly. 76 
The question remains as to what sort of injury qualifies for article 
III standing. The Court has asserted that the claimed injury must 
be "distinct and palpable. "77 It must be concrete, not "conjectural" 
or "hypothetical. "78 The injury must also be traceable to the defen-
dant's alleged activity79 and the plaintiff must expect relief from the 
injury to follow from a favorable decision in the case.80 The Court's 
71 Id. at 101-06. 
72 See id. at 97 (power of federal judiciary limited to those disputes that fit in framework of 
separated powers). 
73 See Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (case and controversy clause precludes conversion of federal courts 
into equivalent of debating societies). 
74Id. 
75 The other requirement of constitutional standing, that the plaintiff must expect relief to 
follow from a favorable decision in the case, is related to the requirement that the plaintiff 
have suffered injury in fact. See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 
376, 385 (1987); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
76 This reasoning, however, has been criticized by both courts and commentators. It has 
been noted that many plaintiffs, unable to allege a "personal stake" in the resolution of a case, 
are nevertheless vigorous advocates of their position. See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as 
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 891 (1983) 
(parties not injured in fact are often diligent advocates); see also K. DAVIS, supra note 20, 
§ 24.18,281-85; CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION, FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS, § 9.19 (1981) ("no 
one can honestly entertain fears of inadequate representation when the Sierra Club sues to 
protect the environment."). In apparent contradiction of its emphasis on the relation of a 
plaintiff's ability to allege injury in fact to the proper functioning of a court, the Valley Forge 
Court says that "standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the 
fervor of his advocacy." 454 U.S. at 473. 
77 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
78 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1982) (standing denied in challenge to use of 
chokeholds by Los Angeles police officers because plaintiff, who had been victim of chokehold 
in past, sued to enjoin future use of chokeholds). 
79 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (standing denied 
plaintiff organizations that challenged Internal Revenue Service policy of extending tax-
exempt status to hospitals that refuse to provide services to indigent patients). 
fl(J Id. 
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insistence that "injury" meet certain standards so as to be sufficient 
for article III purposes places additional limitations on Congress's 
power to confer standing to plaintiffs through the use of statutorily 
created injuries. 81 
"Injury" is not limited in scope to the sort of economic harm 
traditionally thought of as the proper object of judicial relief. 82 The 
Supreme Court no longer questions that aesthetic harm may 
"amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing 
"83 
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP)84 the Court noted the amenability of federal courts 
to the hearing of cases relating to aesthetic injuries. 85 In SCRAP, 
the Court greatly liberalized the concept of injury in fact by allowing 
an organization to sue to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion from collecting a surcharge on shipments by railroads. 86 Alleging 
that the surcharge resulted in "increased pollution,"87 the organiza-
tion claimed to have standing through injuries suffered by each of 
its members. 88 
SCRAP, with its broad construction of the "injury" required for 
injury in fact, is illustrative of what Justice Scalia has referred to as 
the federal judiciary's "love affair with environmental litigation."89 
The decision to grant standing, based on largely conjectural inju-
ries,90 would probably not issue from the post-SCRAP Supreme 
Court if the precise issue presented in SCRAP were presented 
again. 91 
81 See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. 
82 Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1971) (it has long been accepted that economic 
injury is sufficient to confer standing). 
83 Id. (noting that destruction of wildlife is still injury in fact although not economic injury). 
84 412 U.S. 669 (1972) [hereinafter SCRAP]. 
86 Id. at 686-87. 
86 Id. at 674-78. 
87Id. at 678. 
88 Id. 
89 Scalia, supra note 76, at 884. 
90 The organization in SCRAP filed suit in May, 1972, to challenge a surcharge which went 
into effect less than four months earlier. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 678. Still, the group alleged 
that the increased expense of hauling scrap metal had resulted in the degradation of the air, 
"forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources" surrounding Washington, 
D.C. Id. The group also alleged that its members had to pay increased taxes as a result of 
the surcharge. Id. Unless it is reasonable to believe that all of these injuries had or could 
have resulted in such a short span of time, or that the group was immediately in danger of 
sustaining these injuries, then the injuries alleged in SCRAP were of a primarily conjectural 
nature. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1982). 
91 See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02 (to have article III standing, plaintiffs may not allege 
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III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PLAINTIFF AND GENERALIZED 
GRIEVANCES 
The organizational standing question raised in SCRAP has re-
ceived considerable attention from federal courts. The organizational 
standing issue frequently involves a consideration of the standing of 
one party to sue on behalf of another.92 This issue frequently arises 
in the context of citizen suits. 
Citizen suits are an increasingly popular and effective means of 
enforcing federal environmental statutes. 93 They are often chal-
lenged on a number of grounds not going to the merits of the suit, 94 
merely conjectural or hypothetical injury); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway 
Transportation Safety Ass., 793 F.2d 1322, 1342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing litany of cases urging more stringent application of injury in fact requirement). See 
also Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative 
Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863, 869 (1977) (sees reversal of liberalization of standing 
effected under Warren Court); CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION, FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 9.19 
(1981) (on the basis of recent Supreme Court dicta, predicts that "Congress will be held 
without power to confer standing on one who is not injured"). 
92 See generally Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party 
Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393 (1981). 
93 The right of private citizens to sue to enforce federal statutes, whether expressly or 
impliedly granted, is well-settled. See Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution 
Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10309 (Envtl. L. Inst.) [hereinafter Miller]; see also 
Meier, Citizen Suits' Become a Popular Weapon in the Fight Against Industrial Polluters, 
Wall St. J., April 17, 1987, at 17, col. 3. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. has published 
a report documenting the fact that "[p]rivate citizens are increasingly filing lawsuits against 
corporate polluters .... " 18 Env't Rep. 2227 (BNA) (Feb. 26, 1988). An example of the 
power of citizens to bring suit for violations of non-environmental statutes is the implied 
private right of action that the Supreme Court found in § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1963) (implied private right of action to 
seek redress of violation of '34 Act's prohibition of misleading proxy statements). Environ-
mental citizen suit provisions, however, are not necessarily designed to vindicate the economic 
interests of the plaintiff. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text for discussion of non-
pecuniary injury and the liberalization of the injury in fact requirement. Rather, environmental 
citizen suit provisions are motivated primarily by a desire to involve "real private attorneys 
general" in the enforcement of federal environmental statutes. Miller, supra, at 10,309-10. 
However, because the Constitution requires plaintiffs to have more than the general public 
interest in mind, see, e.g., Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1971), qui tam actions are, 
absent express statutory authorization, of dubious validity in the United States. Miller, supra, 
at 10,309 n.2 (noting unsuccessful attempts at establishing qui tam standing). The qui tam is 
a statutorily provided form of action in which a private party invokes the government's 
standing in an attempt to enforce a law. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3531.13, at 76 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT]. Two commentators, believing that 
citizen suit provisions are an underutilized means of involving citizens in environmental 
enforcement, have recently offered advice intended to facilitate public participation in the 
pollution control effort. Babich and Hanson, Opportunities for Environmental Enforcement 
and Cost Recovery by Local Governments and Citizen Organizations, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,165 (May, 1988). 
94 See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (citizen 
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including the ground that the plaintiff, or one of the plaintiffs, is an 
organization95 that has suffered only an abstract and general "injury" 
to its interests and thus has suffered no actual injury in fact. 96 It is 
argued that the the organization therefore lacks standing to sue. 
The issue of whether an organization or institution has standing 
to sue on behalf of its members was addressed by the Supreme Court 
in Sierra Club v. Morton,97 Warth v. Seldin,98 and more recently in 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission. 99 
In Sierra v. Morton the Sierra Club sought to enjoin the United 
States Forest Service from authorizing Walt Disney Enterprises to 
construct a ski resort in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia 
National Forest.lOo Sierra brought suit pursuant to the judicial re-
view provision of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").lol The 
Court had to determine whether the Sierra Club was "adversely 
affected or aggrieved"lo2 by the Forest Service's decision to permit 
the ski resort. 
The Court noted that because the "Sierra Club failed to allege 
that it or one of its members would be affected in any of their 
activities or pastimes"103 by the proposed development, it therefore 
lacked standing. 104 The Court further noted that the Sierra Club's 
suit successfully defended on ground that alleged violations of Clean Water Act had occurred 
wholly in the past); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation, 834 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987) (would-be intervenor in CAA 
section 304 citizen suit denied party status pursuant to FED. R. Cry. P. 24 because its interests 
were adequately represented by governmental defendant). 
95 See Meier, supra note 93. The participation of environmental organizations in citizen suits 
is attributable to various obvious logistical factors, such as the added resources and litigation 
expertise the specialized organization can bring to the lawsuit. Id. (suggests preeminence of 
certain organizations in the field of citizen suits). See also United Auto Workers v. Brock, 106 
S. Ct. 2523, 2533 (1986) (notes various advantages of involving associations in litigation). 
96 Reference to many cases involving citizen group action in an environmental context 
reveals the frequency with which standing defenses are raised-and generally defeated. See, 
e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (EPA questioned 
NWF's standing in case where pleadings did not mention injury to specific members of 
organization). 
97 405 U.S. 727 (1971). 
98 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
99 432 U.S. 333 (1976). 
100 Sierra, 405 U.S. at 728~0. 
101Id. at 730. The judicial review provision, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), provides in part: "A 
person suffering legal wrong because of an agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof." 
102 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
103 Sierra, 405 U. S. at 735. 
104 Id. at 740. 
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general interest in environmental preservation was an inadequate 
basis upon which to establish the club's standing as an organiza-
tion. 105 
In Warth v. Seldin,106 decided several years after Sierra, the 
Supreme Court expanded on its earlier holding by noting that or-
ganizations that are not legitimately able to assert their own legal 
interests or rights, but must assert instead the legal rights of third 
parties,107 do not have standing. 108 
The Warth Court noted .that constitutional problems arise when 
an organization brings before a court an issue in which the organi-
zation has no apparent stake. 109 Organizations, which in light of 
Sierra's reasoning have no standing by virtue of a special interest 
in a matter,110 threaten to place courts in the position of adjudicating 
"abstract questions of wide public significance . . . ."111 
The Warth Court held that organizations bringing suit under a 
statute expressly or impliedly granting a cause of action may have 
standing so long as they meet the requirements of article III. 112 So 
long as article Ill's requirements are met, the organization may seek 
to vindicate the rights of others. 113 
The "others" to which the Court refers are the members of the 
organization in question. 114 The Warth Court interpreted the Sierra 
holding to be a formulation of the following organizational standing 
requirements: 
The association must allege that its members, or anyone of 
them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result 
of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a jus-
105 [d. at 739-41. 
106 422 U.S. 490 (1974). 
107 The jus tertii, or the legal rights of third parties, is traditionally not a basis upon which 
to establish standing. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576 (1914). For a 
general discussion of third party Standing, see generally Rohr, supra note 92. 
lOS Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
109 [d. (article III judicial power exists only to redress injury to the complaining party, even 
though court's judgment may benefit others incidentally). 
llO Sierra, 405 U.S. at 739. 
111 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. The Court calls the limitation on general interest standing 
"essentially [a matter] of judicial self-governance" but still "closely related to Art. III concerns 
. . . . " [d. The "general grievance" standing question is so closely related to article III concerns 
that it is often indistinguishable from prudential standing concerns. See infra notes 212-32 
and accompanying text. 
ll2 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
ll3 [d. 
ll4 Sierra, 405 U.S. at 740. That an organization can claim injury in fact only if it or any of 
its members has suffered injury in fact is the central teaching of Sierra. (Sierra's failure to 
allege that its members had suffered from the Forest Service's decision fatal to its case). 
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ticiable case had the members themselves brought suit. So long 
as this can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim 
and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation 
of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the 
cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of 
its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 115 
297 
After Warth and Sierra, the Court further refined the organiza-
tional standing test in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Com-
mission. u6 In Hunt, a commission representing apple growers from 
Washington state sued to enjoin the implementation of a North 
Carolina statute which required that apples shipped into that state 
"bear 'no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard."'117 
The Commission challenged the statute because it allegedly posed 
an unconstitutional restraint on interstate commerce in that it pre-
vented apples from Washington from bearing notice of compliance 
with that state's heightened quality standards.ll8 North Carolina 
claimed that the Commission, which was "charged with . . . pro-
moting and protecting the state's apple industry," lacked the per-
sonal stake in the controversy necessary to confer standing. U9 
The Hunt Court, in concluding that the Commission did have 
standing to seek injunctive relief,120 set forth the following three-
part test of organizational standing: 
Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to 
bring suit on behalf of its members121 when: (a) its members 
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the 
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's 
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit. 122 
The Hunt formulation of the organizational standing test differed 
from previous formulations in that it required that the organization 
seek to protect interests "germane" to its purpose. 123 
115 Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 (citation omitted). 
116 432 U.S. 333 (1976). 
117 Id. at 335. 
118Id. at 335-36. 
119Id. at 341. 
120 Id. at 345. 
121 North Carolina claimed that the Commission lacked "members" in the usual sense because 
it represented local growers who had not volunteered to be represented. Id. at 342. The 
Court, however, found that "while the apple growers and dealers are not 'members' ... in 
the traditional trade association sense, they possess all of the indicia of membership in an 
organization." Id. at 344. 
122 I d. at 343. 
123 The meaning of the "germaneness" requirement is far from settled. See, e.g., Humane 
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The Supreme Court's position that an individual or an organization 
does not have standing merely by virtue of its interest in a problem 
retains its vitality.124 One court125 recently considered whether a 
Senator had standing126 to challenge the appointment of a fellow 
member of Congress to the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals on the 
ground that his appointment violated the ineligiblity clause of the 
Constitution. 127 The court first decided the Senator's standing "as a 
private individual. "128 It then considered whether the Senator had 
standing not as an individual, but as a Senator-a member of Con-
gress with "special duties and responsibilities. "129 
Deciding both questions negatively, the court cited Ex Parte Lev-
itt,130 a Supreme Court case in which it was said that a plaintiff must 
show that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of su~taining 
a direct injury . . . and it is not sufficient that he has merely a 
general interest common to all members of the public. "131 
Additional support for this proposition is found in two Supreme 
Court cases in which standing was denied to groups challenging 
actions taken by members of Congress. In Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War132 standing was denied to a plaintiff 
organization that challenged the ability of various members of Con-
gress to be members of the Army Reserve, in apparent violation of 
the Incompatibility Clause. 133 It was held, in reliance on Ex Parte 
Levitt,134 that "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an inter-
Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 53-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (advocates "mere 
pertinence between litigation subject and organizational purpose"). 
124 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39-40 
(1975) (plaintiff organizations could not establish standing solely by virtue of their interest in 
providing health services to indigents); see also Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 103 
(2d Cir. 1984) (Sierra's general interest in environmental protection inadequate to confer 
standing). 
125 McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), a/I'd memo sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 
454 U.S. 1025 (1981). 
126 McClure, 513 F. Supp. at 269. The Senator brought suit pursuant to an Act of October 
12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656 (not codified). 
127 McClure, 513 F. Supp. at 266. The ineligibility clause of the Constitution provides that 
no members of Congress will be appointed to an office that was created or that was voted a 
higher salary during their term of service in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
128 513 F. Supp. at 269-70. 
129 [d. at 270. 
130 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (member of Supreme Court bar challenged appointment of Justice 
Black on grounds that appointment violated eligibility clause of Constitution). 
131 [d. at 634 (emphasis added). 
132 418 U.S. 208 (1973). 
133 [d. at 209. The incompatibility clause provides that no one shall occupy an office of the 
United States and be a member of Congress at the same time. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
134 302 U.S. 633 (1937). 
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est ... held in common by all members of the pUblic. "135 Similarly, 
in United States v. Richardson,136 standing was denied on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had but a generalized grievance. 137 
The question of whether the reluctance to entertain the claims of 
plaintiffs with generalized grievances is a prudential or constitutional 
limitation on standing is vital to a consideration of the utility of 
section 304 as a vehicle for organizational participation in Clean Air 
Act citizen suits. 138 
IV. CONGRESS'S POWER TO GRANT STANDING 
As a starting point in the consideration of whether a congressional 
attempt to expand standing via a statute such as section 304 is a 
valid exercise of legislative power, it must be noted that Congress 
legitimately exerts control over many aspects of the federal court 
system. 139 As to control of the exercise of federal court jurisdiction 
through an expansion of standing, it has been held that Congress 
may abrogate traditional standing requirements up to the limits 
imposed by the Constitution. 140 
Congress may grant a right to sue for plaintiffs who "otherwise 
would be barred by prudential standing rules."141 Although it is clear 
that Congress may not go beyond the article III limits,142 it is unclear 
as to where these limits lie. 143 When he was sitting on the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Scalia summarized the 
current state of the law when he wrote that "even Congress itself 
may not confer standing to sue where the case and controversy 
requirements of Article III of the Constitution are not met. "144 Al-
though succinctly stated, the meaning of this limitation on Congress's 
power is, in the view of one commentator, "rather puzzling."145 
135 Reservists, 418 U.S. at 220. 
136 418 U.S. 166 (1973) (taxpayers objection to CIA's apparent failure to comply with ac-
counts clause held a general grievance inadequate to confer standing). 
137 [d. at 175. 
138 See infra notes 212-32 and accompanying text. 
139 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This is the source of the systemic control that the legislature 
exercises over the judiciary: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish." [d. 
140 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (Congress may grant express right 
of action, but article Ill's requirement that plaintiff show a distinct injury remains). 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
143 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
144 Safir v. Dole, 718 F.2d 475, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
145 C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, § 3531.13, at 67. 
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A. Statutorily Created Rights: The Shifting Contours of Injury in 
Fact 
Through the typical legislative process in which statutes either 
codify common law or alter common law doctrine, the enactment of 
a statute often creates judicially cognizable rights and, a fortiori, 
standing to vindicate those rights.146 The invasion of these legisla-
tively created rights often constitutes the injury in fact requisite to 
establish standing. 147 
The newly created rights may be visited by harm that does not 
conform to any traditional conception of what constitutes a legally 
cognizable injury.148 It is conceivable that in the exercise of this 
power Congress may elect to create innumerable rights and concom-
itantly an innumerable class of federal court plaintiffs. The Supreme 
Court, however, has never fully accepted Congress's power to do 
SO.149 This unwillingness suggests that there exist limits on how far 
Congress can go to create "injuries" that do not fit any traditional 
conception of harm. 150 
In turn, the limitation on Congress's power to create injuries 
suggests that there are also limits to Congress's power to exercise 
the reasoning that rights may be legislatively created, that the 
violation of these rights constitutes an injury, and that standing can 
therefore exist where it did not exist before.151 One court suggested 
recently that Congress's power in this direction is indeed checked 
by the Constitution, ruling that a congressional intention to confer 
146 Warth, 422 U.S. at 514 (Congress may create statutory rights and entitlements that, if 
deprived, create standing even though plaintiff would have suffered no ''judicially cognizable 
injury" in the statute's absence). 
147 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1972) (Congress may pass statutes 
that create legal rights, the invasion of which confers standing, although no cognizable injury 
would arise in the statute's absence); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 224 (1973) (Court has "no doubt" that once Congress enacts a statute creating 
a legal right, the injury required for standing can be found in the invasion of that right); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (injury in fact necessary for article III standing may exist solely as a 
result of a statute creating a legal right). 
148 C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, § 3531.13, at 75. This point is distinct from the broadening 
of judicially cognizable injuries represented by SCRAP and other decisions recognizing injuries 
, apart from economic harm. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
14. C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, § 3531.13, at 77. 
160 The Court has remarked that Congress may not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to 
resolve "political questions." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1971) (citing Luther 
v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1 (1848». Certain injuries, of a general character, have been 
likened to "political questions." See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
161 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, § 3531.13, at 76-77 (noting that Congress' power to 
expand legally cognizable rights is limited). 
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standing is not always "consistent with the Article III minima" of 
injury in fact. 152 
It has been held that the requirement of injury in fact remains in 
place despite an apparent congressional intent to confer standing on 
everyone. 153 To the extent that standing is a prudential concept, 
Congress's power to create standing is well settled. 154 To the extent 
that standing is a constitutionally based doctrine-based on the sep-
aration of powers and the role of the federal courts in the federal 
systemI55-Congress's power is limited to the abrogation of only the 
prudential barriers on standing. 156 
B. Bice and Scalia: Conflicting Interpretations of Congress's 
Power to Expand Standing 
When standing is viewed as a function of the separation of powers 
inherent in the Constitution,157 it is premised on a belief that certain 
tasks in a tripartite government are inherently judicial, others leg-
islative, and still others executive in nature. 15S 
According to commentators who maintain that standing is essen-
tially a function of the separation of powers, the case or controversy 
clause insures that courts will perform only judicial tasks. 159 Con-
gress cannot delegate to courts responsibilities that must be carried 
out in a representative forum. 160 
The federal courts have an interest in limiting their jurisdiction in 
order to insure their proper role in the constitutional system of 
152 Sierra Club v. SCM, 747 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1984) (Congressional intention to extend 
standing to those not injured in fact may not be permissible). 
153 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (Congress may grant an express right of action to plaintiffs but 
article III requirement remains in place). 
154 Id. (Congress may grant right of action to plaintiffs who would normally be barred by 
prudential standing considerations). 
155 See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. 
156 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. Similarly, the courts have no power to erect prudential barriers 
against a plaintiff clearly authorized to sue under a statute. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
455 U.S. 363, 372 (1981) (in citizen suit under Fair Housing Act, Congress' creation of a right 
of action cannot be defeated by judicial erection of prudential barriers). 
157 See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. 
158 In civics class terms: the legislature enacts laws (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1); the executive 
"takes care" that they are executed (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); and the judiciary interprets 
them (U.S. CONST. art. III). Rarely is the matter so simple when raised in the context of the 
modern federal government. See, e.g., Morrisson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (unsuccessful 
challenge to constitutional validity of Ethics in Government Act's provision for judicially 
appointed independent counsel). 
159 See supra note 16. 
160 See supra notes 49-52 and -accompanying text. 
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government. 161 That role may be compromised when Congress refers 
new business to the courts that expands their jurisdiction to resolve 
matters previously left to legislative, executive or administrative 
resolution. 162 Alternatively, separation of powers concerns generated 
by a fear of "judicial legislation" may be averted when Congress has 
expressly invited the courts to intervene. 163 
1. Professor Bice: Separation of Powers as a Function of 
Congressional Acquiescence to Judicial Review 
There are some functions that the Executive cannot allow Con-
gress to perform,164 some that Congress cannot ask the Executive 
to perform,165 and, logically, some that Congress cannot ask the 
judiciary to perform. 166 Professor Scott Bice167 hypothesizes, for ex-
ample, that Congress cannot request the Supreme Court to provide 
advice and consent to the Executive for the appointment of one of 
its own members. 168 The task of providing advice and consent to the 
Executive's appointments is Congress's, and Congress's alone. 169 
The use of citizen suits presents a separation of powers problem 
in that the citizen suit reflects a congressional willingness to delegate 
additional responsibilities to the Federal jUdiciary. 170 The fear is that 
Congress, by ignoring such concepts as injury in fact, will convert 
the courts into open forums for the resolution of political disputes. 171 
161 See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (concept of 
standing part of method of limiting judiciary to its proper role in constitutional syst.em of 
government). 
162 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
163 See Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Transportation Safety Ass., 793 F.2d 
1322, 1337 (D. C. Cir. 1986) (separation of powers concerns should not restrain judicial review 
once Congress has extended standing to broadened class of plaintiffs). 
164 E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 (1975) (officers of the United States must be 
appointed by Executive, not Congress). 
165 E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537--38 (1934) 
(Congress may not delegate law-making function to the Executive). 
166 E.g., Morrisson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (congressional power to delegate argu-
ably executive function to judiciary challenged but upheld). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 123 (1976) ("executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be 
imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constititution."). 
167 Bice, Congress' Power to Confer Standing in the Federal Courts, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 291 (Collins ed. 1980) [hereinafter Bice]. 
168 [d. at 295. 
169 U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2. 
170 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. In some instances, plaintiffs in citizen 
suits invoke the court's jurisdiction to settle what are arguably "political questions. " [d. 
171 [d. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) 
("Unrestrained standing in ... citizen suits would create a remarkably illogical system of 
judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government. "). 
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Professor Eice maintains that the answer to how far Congress 
may go to abrogate traditional standing requirements can be divined 
in the rationale underlying the injury in fact requirement. 172 
Bice commences by positing that the assessment of Congress's 
ability to create "judicially enforceable citizen interests"173 should 
focus on an inquiry into the rationale underlying the injury in fact 
requirement. 174 Bice senses two possible reasons for the require-
ment: (1) the requirement serves to prevent the judiciary from infr-
inging on the province of the political branches; or (2) the require-
ment insures the "effective functioning of the jUdiciary. "175 
According to Bice, if the requirement is designed to serve the 
effective functioning of the judiciary, then the Supreme Court is 
correct in concluding that Congress cannot confer standing in the 
absence of injury in fact.176 If, however, the requirement serves the 
other goal-that of preventing the judiciary from intruding on the 
province of political branches-then "congressional power to confer 
standing in the absence of injury in fact would be greater .... "177 
Bice concludes that it is more reasonable to view the injury in fact 
requirement as related not to the effective functioning of the judi-
ciary, but rather as intended to prevent judicial intrusions on the 
province occupied by other branches of government. 178 Bice further 
concludes that "[a]rticle III does not require an injury in fact beyond 
the alleged invasion of a congressionally created citizen interest 
"179 
Eice endeavors to go beyond the familiar but confusing "pruden-
tial" and "constitutional" rhetoric. 18o He concludes that the standing 
172 Eice, supra note 167, at 296. 
173 Prof. Eice uses this term to describe the type of non-injury-based standing embodied in 
statutes such as Section 304. [d. at 293. 
174 [d. at 296. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. at 297. Eice reaches this conclusion based on the example of Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1975). He reasons that if Congress consents to 
judicial review of its own alleged wrongdoing, that is, to review of the merits of a "generalized 
grievance" based on governmental misconduct, then separation of powers concerns are ren-
dered moot. Eice, supra note 167, at 297. 
179 Eice, supra note 167, at 299. Eice goes on to agree with the D.C. Circuit's holding in 
Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), decided in the context of a section 304 suit. See infra notes 300-10 and accompanying 
text. Eice takes issue with the contrary result reached in Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973). See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text; 
Eice, supra note 167, at 300. 
180 See Eice, supra note 167, at 297 (notes that prudential and constitutional distinctions are 
of little help in answering question of how far Congress may expand standing). 
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requirement is related to a fear that the judiciary tends to address 
abstract issues when it expands standing, and thereby encroaches 
on the province of more responsive, representative branches. 181 Ac-
cording to Bice, once the legislature has spoken, and has acquiesced 
to the court's jurisdiction over a particular issue, the citizen suit 
does not infringe on the essential functions of other branches. 182 
2. Justice Scalia: Separation of Powers Concerns Cannot Be 
Legislated Away 
In contrast to Bice, Justice Scalia believes that standing is ulti-
mately related to separation of powers concerns. l83 The power of 
Congress to expand standing is, therefore, inescapably limited. 184 In 
Scalia's view, congressional approval, express or implied, to expand-
ing standing "cannot validate judicial disregard" for the boundaries 
that exist between branches of government. 185 
Scalia bases this theory-that courts are subject to certain irred-
ucible and unavoidable constraints on their role-on the notion that 
courts traditionally perform "undemocratic" functions. 186 Other 
branches of government, by contrast, are democratic, representa-
tive, and majoritarian. 187 Courts protect minority interests against 
the tyranny of the majority.l88 Ideally, the executive and the legis-
lative branches serve the majoritarian interests. Courts are not the 
proper arbiter of how the majority is best served. 189 
A universal grant of standing, even though an "acquiescence" of 
Congress to judicial intervention, forces courts to hear the claims of 
the majority because plaintiffs need not allege palpable injuries that 
181Id. Bice notes: "It is [easy] to see a relationship between injury in fact and prevention 
of judicial intrusion on the other branches." Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Scalia, supra note 76. It has been questioned whether subsequent decisions from Justice 
Scalia are entirely consistent with the theories advanced in this 1983 article. See Comment, 
Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 135, 165 (1988). 
184 Scalia, supra note 76, at 886. Scalia notes: "there is a limit upon even the power of 
Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights-and that is the limitation imposed 
by the so-called 'core' requirement of standing." Id. 
185 Id. at 893-94 n.58. 
186 Id. at 894. 
187 Cf. id. at 894-97 (noting that the judiciary is inherently undemocratic as compared to 
other two branches). 
188 Id. at 894 (courts protect individuals and minorities from impositions of the majority). 
189Id. Scalia suggests that it is an undemocratic function for a court to prescribe "how the 
other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself" I d. 
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set themselves apart from the general public. 190 According to this 
view, moreover, the counter-majoritarian role ofthe federal judiciary 
is so inherent that standing doctrine should preclude the allowance 
of a claim by the majority-as-plaintiff even if a "concrete injury" is 
alleged, such as an injury to "all who breathe [the air]."191 The 
democratic process that inheres in the executive and legislative 
branches, and not the undemocratic process that inheres in the 
courts, should resolve and protect the interests of "all-inclusive" 
classes of citizens. 192 In light of this theory, section 304 would be 
unconstitutional even if a majoritarian plaintiff suing under the pro-
vision is able to claim injury in fact. 193 
It would seem that Scalia's view may prevail over Bice's. Even 
before Justice Scalia's ascension to the Supreme Court, one com-
mentator had noticed that the liberalization of the standing doctrine 
which occurred under the early Burger Court has been modified in 
favor of a more rigid adherence to the injury in fact standard. 194 The 
commentator notes that standing has once again become a "formid-
able obstacle to judicial review. "195 
C. The Supreme Court has Provided Confused Guidance as to 
Congress's Power to Expand Standing 
Analyzing the future course of Supreme Court standing jurispru-
dence is of course an exercise in speculation. Evaluating the Court's 
historic position on the issue of Congress's power to expand standing 
is an equally speculative task. In light of Supreme Court precedents, 
the limits to which Congress may expand standing are "rather 
puzzling"196 at best, and are consistent with the generally amorphous 
nature of standing, at worst. 197 
The Court's treatment of Congress's power to expand standing up 
to the limits of article III is relatively clear in cases such as Glad-
190 Id. at 895-96. 
191Id. (citing U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973». 
192 I d. at 896. 
193 See id. Scalia suggests that the plaintiff with a grievance held in common with and 
indistinguishable from "all who breathe" would "receive fair consideration in the normal 
political process." I d. Such a plaintiff presents a political question the type of which the 
Constitution delegates to representative fora. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
194 Sedler, supra note 91, at 868. 
195Id. 
196 C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, § 3531.13, at 67. 
197 Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 
YALE L.J. 816 (1969). 
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stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. 198 In Gladstone, the Court 
ruled on the standing of various citizens to sue under the citizen suit 
provision of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.199 This section authorized 
the initiation of civil suits in U.S. District Court, but did not define 
which citizens had standing to sue.200 
The realtor petitioners in Gladstone claimed that, because respon-
dents had not really been seeking housing, but rather had acted as 
"testers" to determine the amenability of petitioners to renting hous-
ing units to blacks, they lacked standing to sue under the Act. 201 
The Court found that in the Fair Housing Act Congress had at-
tempted to "expand standing to the full extent permitted by article 
III. "202 
The Court held that Congress "may" expand standing to a great 
degree, but that "[i]n no event . . . may Congress abrogate the 
article III minima" of injury in fact.203 The Gladstone Court found 
support for its analysis in Warth v. Seldin,204 in which the Court had 
held that Congress may grant a right of action to plaintiffs who 
would normally be barred by prudential considerations, but may not 
abrogate the article III injury in fact requirement. 205 
While the Court's treatment of article III in these cases is clear 
on its face, it becomes less clear206 when considered in light of the 
fact that Congress may create rights, the violation of which is a legal 
injury.207 If Congress may broaden standing by creating an infinite 
array of injuries, then the Court's adamant defense of the article III 
minima is swallowed by its equally adamant defense of Congress's 
right to create legally cognizable rights. 208 The Court, however, has 
198 441 U.S. 91 (1978). 
199 [d. at 94. 
200 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (1982). 
201 Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 97. 
202 [d. at 100. 
203 [d. 
204 422 U.S. 490 (1974). 
205 [d. at 501. 
206 It is also customary for the Court to "answer" the question of how far Congress may go 
to confer standing with language such as that found in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614 (1972): "at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plaintiffs 
must allege some threatened or actual injury." [d. at 617 (emphasis added). It is unclear 
whether this language permits an inference that the injury in fact requirement may be 
dispensed with when a statute expressly grants a right of action. If so, this reasoning is 
clearly at loggerheads with the court's forceful assertion that the injury in fact requirement 
cannot be legislated away. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100. 
207 See supra notes 146-152 and accompanying text. 
208 See Braveman, The Standing Doctrine: A Dialogue Between Court and Congress, 2 
CARDOZO L. REV. 31, 51 (1980) (Congress, in its role as fact finder is the arbiter of relevant 
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said that this broadening of injuries209 is a "different matter from 
abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must 
himself have suffered an injury. "210 The solution to this seeming 
paradox might perhaps be found in the Court's consistent insistence 
that a plaintiff not have an injury "common to all members of the 
pUblic. "211 
D. The General Grievance Barrier: Prudential or Constitutional? 
The power of Congress to create standing in citizen suit provisions 
is directly related to the question of whether the commonly ex-
pressed standing rule barring litigants with "general" or "widely 
shared" grievances is constitutionally or prudentially grounded. 212 
This, again, is an area enshrouded in the inherent indistinctness of 
the prudential and constitutional doctrines.213 
In Warth v. Seldin,214 Justice Powell wrote that the federal judi-
ciary's reluctance to grant standing to a plaintiff with a "generalized 
grievance" exists "apart from [the] minimal constitutional mandate 
[of injury in factJ."215 Powell perceived the generalized grievance 
rule as "closely related to Art. III concerns"216 but essentially pru-
dential. 217 In his opinion, he cites United States v. Richardson218 and 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War19 for the prop-
osition that standing, in both its constitutional and prudential senses, 
is related to the "role of the courts in a democratic society. "220 
In Richardson, however, Chief Justice Burger seems to have 
concluded that the plaintiff with a generalized grievance is barred 
from court by a constitutional barrier.221 The generalized grievance, 
according to Burger, is no substitute for "particular concrete in-
constitutional values, and may conclude that a plaintiff need not show injury in order to satisfy 
the article III minima of case and controversy). 
209 See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
210 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1971). 
211 Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.s. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam). 
212 See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (Congress may not abolish the article III 
mimima). The question, stated differently, is whether the "general grievance" is not, as a 
matter of constitutional law, an "injury in fact". 
213 See supra note 32-84 and accompanying text. 
214 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
215 [d. at 499. 
216 [d. at 499-500. 
217 [d. 
218 418 U.S. 166 (1973). 
219 418 U.S. 208 (1973). 
220 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
221 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177-78. 
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jury."222 Also, the generalized grievance, despite "the acceptance of 
new categories of judicially cognizable injury,"223 is not sufficient to 
endow a plaintiff with the personal stake in the outcome of a contro-
versy necessary for article III standing. 224 
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,225 decided 
the same day as Richardson, the Chief Justice further indicated that 
the general grievance does not always amount to injury in fact. 226 In 
Reservists, the general grievance is equated with the abstract griev-
ance. 227 The Court has recently reaffirmed that "abstract" injuries 
are not a sufficient basis upon which to establish article III stand-
ing. 228 
Reservists' caveat that the general injury is in some instances 
abstract means that, contrary to Powell's dicta in Warth,229 the 
barrier to plaintiffs with generalized grievances is not always pru-
dential. Therefore, the power of Congress to grant standing to an 
organization that would otherwise fail to have standing230 may, in 
instances where the organization seeks to vindicate a general griev-
ance,231 go beyond the limits of article III. The hazy nature of the 
boundary between the general and the abstract, and between the 
prudential and the constitutional, has accounted for much confusion 
in lower courts that have inquired into the standing of plaintiffs 
suing under citizen suit provisions. 232 
222 [d. at 177 (emphasis added). 
223 [d. at 179. 
224 [d. at 179-80. 
226 418 U.S. 208 (1973). 
22iI Reservists, 418 U.S. at 217. 
227 The "claimed nonobservance [of the incompatibility clause], standing alone, would ad-
versely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance, and 
that is an abstract injury." [d. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
228 In Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, lOl-02 (1982), the Court noted: "Abstract injury 
is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury' as a result of the challenged . . . conduct and the injury ... 
must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" 
229 422 U.S. 490 (1973). See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra notes 93-124 and accompanying text. 
281 This is especially true when the statute, like section 304, authorizes suits against the 
government or an agency thereof. This is the challenge to government conduct which the 
Reservists Court deemed to be based on a general (and therefore abstract) injury. Reservists, 
418 U.S. at 217. 
2S2 See infra notes 270--8lO and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's ambiguity in this 
area has led to conflicting results in lower federal courts. One court has flatly asserted that 
Congress may grant standing to whom it pleases, without consideration of the injury in fact 
requirement. Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 
F.2d 809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (section 304 suit to enforce D.C. air quality standards 
against municipal incinerator). Other courts have explicitly denied Congress the right to 
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E. Summary 
Congress's power to extend standing to new classes of plaintiffs 
is extensive. That power, however, is limited to the abrogation of 
prudential barriers to a plaintiff's standing.233 Although the Supreme 
Court's position on this issue has been inconsistent and confusing, 234 
it is clear that Congress may not legislatively discard the injury in 
fact requirement. 235 
Congress may create new legal rights, the invasion of which cre-
ates standing. 236 The validity of section 304's universal standing 
grant hinges, then, on whether the provision can be construed as 
creating a cognizable legal right or merely as creating a mechanism 
by which plaintiffs may gain access to federal court to vent their 
dissatisfaction with enforcement efforts. The answer to this question 
cannot be found without reference to the legislative history of the 
Clean Air Act. 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 304 
Having set forth the nature of Congress's ability to grant standing, 
it is logical to next consider Congress's intentions in enacting section 
304 of the Clean Air Act. It is well established that "[t]he starting 
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute it-
declare everyone an eligible plaintiff. E.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 103-05 
(2d Cir. 1984) (questions constitutionality of intent to confer standing on groups such as Sierra 
Club); Safir v. Dole, 718 F.2d 475, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Congress may not confer standing to 
sue when the case and controversy requirements are not met). Some courts, following the 
example of the Supreme Court, have wavered. E.g., RITE-Research Improves the Envi-
ronment, Inc. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 1312, 1319 (5th Cir. 1981) (in context of Clean Water Act 
citizen suit provision, existence of provision makes plaintiff's claim to standing "even 
stronger"). This ambiguity is especially reflected in section 304 suits in which the court inquires 
into a plaintiff's standing even though the statute permits "any person" to sue, without 
considering whether section 304 renders this inquiry unnecessary. E.g., State of New York 
v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1480 (D.D.C. 1985) (denying section 304 standing for the 
assertion of a general grievance), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 
1986) (questions and then grants citizen group standing in section 304 suit even though 
provision seems to render such an inquiry unnecessary); Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 602 F. 
Supp. 892, 896-97 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (inquires into organization's standing in section 304 suit). 
233 See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 197-226 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's position on this 
point is well-settled. The debate represented by the Bice and Scalia views is centered not 
around the viability of the injury in fact requirement as the test of constitutional standing, 
but is concerned instead with the question of whether the injury in fact requirement is a 
proper and indispensable corollary to the case and controversy clause. 
236 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
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self. "237 The language of section 304, however, reveals only an ap-
parent attempt to confer standing to sue under the Act to "any-
one. "238 A meaningful attempt at statutory interpretation in this 
instance requires viewing section 304 from the perspective of those 
who drafted and enacted it. 
It is not helpful to engage in a "comparative analysis" of section 
304 by setting it against citizen suit provisions that embody standing 
grants more in accord with orthodox constitutional standing doc-
trine.239 Most of the citizen suit provisions in federal environmental 
statutes were passed after the ruling in Sierra Club v. Morton , 240 
which provided Congress with more guidance as to the validity of 
citizen standing.241 Instead, because section 304 was passed before 
the decision in Sierra, it is necessary to rely almost exclusively on 
the legislative history of section 304. Unfortunately, the legislative 
history of the CAA amendments of 1970 sheds little light on Con-
gress's uncharacteristic use of the words "any person" in section 304. 
Section 304 was passed in 1970 as part of wholesale revisions in 
existing air pollution control legislation.242 The broad purpose of the 
revised statute was to effectuate a better mechanism for addressing 
the nation's air pollution problems.243 Congress determined that 
"[a]ir pollution continues to be a threat to the health and well-being 
of the American people."244 One reason for the new standing provi-
sion was the perceived failure of the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration245 to adequately enforce existing pollution legisla-
tion.246 
237 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 
108 (1980). 
238 The statute, read literally, grants standing to plaintiffs regardless of their interest in the 
dispute: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a 
civil action on his own behalf .... " 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Subsection (b) introduces no limitation 
on standing. [d. § 7604(b). 
239 E.g., Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) [hereinafter 
section 505]. For additional discussion of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision see infra 
notes 324-25 and accompanying text. 
240 405 U.S. 727 (1971). 
241 Miller, supra note 93, at 10315-16. 
242 The new act replaced the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 
(1967). 
243 H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5356. 
244 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5360. 
245 The National Air Pollution Control Administration was EPA's predecessor agency in the 
air pollution regulation field. 
246 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5360. 
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There is some indication in the legislative history of section 304 
that Congress felt that citizens should feel unconstrained to bring 
enforcement actions in special situations, such as when a violator of 
an emission standard fails to comply with an EPA enforcement or-
der.247 The perceived inadequacies of federal enforcement and their 
relation to the need for citizen suits are echoed in a Senate Report: 
"[g]overnment initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air 
Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for vio-
lations of standards should motivate governmental agencies charged 
with the responsibility to bring enforcement and :;batement pro-
ceedings. "248 
One witness before a Senate committee hearing on the citizen suit 
provision stated that it is important to involve citizens in policy-
setting.249 Another witness stated that for a number of reasons it is 
not feasible to rely solely on government agencies to enforce the air 
pollution laws.25O This witness characterized the citizen suit provision 
as a "private attorneys general provision. "251 The witness viewed 
the provision as a way to ensure the participation of "frustrated"252 
citizens in the enforcement process. 253 
The House of Representatives did not suggest inclusion of a citizen 
suit provision in its recommended 1970 Amendments to CAA.254 The 
Senate version would have authorized suits against violators and 
government agencies, subject only to certain notice requirements, 
but without any sort of limitation on standing. 255 
The conference bill would have limited citizen standing "to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution. "256 It is unclear why this 
247 See generally 116 CONGo REC. 33,103-05 (1970) (Senate debate focused on beneficial 
effect of liberalized standing on enforcement process). 
248 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970). 
249 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: Hearings on S.3466 Before the Subcommittee 
on Air and Water Pollution, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 619-21 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(statement of Rep. Abner Mikva, D. Ill.). 
250 [d. at 622 (statement of James Moorman, esq., Washington D.C.). 
251 [d. 
252 [d. It is interesting to note the use of the word "frustrating" rather than injured. [d. 
253 [d. 
254 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5388. 
255 [d. The Senate version is the essence of the bill eventually enacted. The divergence of 
views between the HO)lse and Senate is probably related not to any standing issue (see infra 
notes 259-66 and accompanying text) but rather to conflicting perceptions of the need to 
buttress federal enforcement efforts. 
256 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 56. This phrase probably refers to 
Flast V. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967), and the standing doctrine announced therein. 
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language was not included in the enacted bill.257 It is clear, however, 
that the language suggested by the conferees would have cured any 
constitutional deficiencies in section 304. Instead, the Senate version 
was :finally enacted, incorporating the controversial "any person" 
language. 258 
Congress did not directly address the possible constitutional inl-
plications of section 304's universal standing grant.259 There is no 
evidence that Congress believed that the status of the plaintiff would 
affect the justiciability of the lawsuit.260 Instead, much of the debate 
over section 304 centered around the tangential issue of the burden 
the provision might place on the federal judiciary. 261 
One witness before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution came close to addressing the universal standing grant in 
constitutional and not merely policy terms. 262 Private plaintiffs, ac-
cording to this witness, find it "frequently impossible"263 to show a 
justiciable controversy in air pollution cases. 264 
This does not necessarily indicate, however, that in enacting sec-
tion 304 Congress intended to circumvent traditional injury in fact 
requirements. By addressing the issue of "justiciability," the hear-
ings were dealing, if only tangentially, with the constitutionality of 
the standing grant. 265 It is therefore conceivable that Congress was 
exercising its power to create a legally cognizable right, the invasion 
257 In light of the ground swell in favor of the heightened citizen participation in the 
enforcement process (see supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text) and because little con-
sideration was paid to the constitutional implications of a universal grant (see infra notes 259-
66 and accompanying text) it is not unlikely that the conferee's language was dismissed because 
it seemed only to undermine the Act's utility as an aid to official enforcement. 
258 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
259 The record of the floor debate in the Senate reveals that there were five objections raised 
to § 304: (1) the measure was of a type with which Senators were unfamiliar; (2) the provision 
may encourage the bringing of frivolous suits; (3) the provision would unduly burden federal 
courts; (4) the provision implied agency (EPA) incompetence; and (5) federal courts lack 
expertise in environmental matters. 116 CONGo REC. 33,103 (1970). In contrast to congressional 
expectations, the Chairman of Health Education and Welfare, the agency initially responsible 
for enforcement of the Act, voiced concern that citizen suits would impair the statutory scheme 
by "distorting [agency] enforcement priorities .... " 116 CONGo REC. 42,390. 
260 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, vol. I, ch. 
3, 273-81 (1974). 
261 See, e.g., id. at 274-79. 
262 Hearings, supra note 249, at 818 (statement of Stanley Preiser, attorney, Charleston, 
W.Va.). 
263 [d. 
264 [d. It is interesting to note that Senator Muskie did not pursue the implication that the 
provision circumvented the justiciability problem. [d. 
265 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (in constitutional terms, standing 
"imports" justiciability). 
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of which creates standing. 266 Alternatively, and perhaps more rea-
sonably,267 it is inferrable that Congress merely intended to create 
a class of private attorneys general to aid in the enforcement of the 
statute.268 A congressional intent to extend standing in a manner 
consistent with article III standing doctrine is not readily discernible 
in the legislative history. It has been left to the courts to fill the gap 
between section 304's language and the article III injury in fact 
requirement. 269 
VI. STANDING To SUE IN SUITS UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT AND 
CLEAN WATER ACT CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS: CIRCUITS 
CONFLICT ON THE NECESSITY OF INJURY IN FACT 
Despite the universal grant of standing embodied in section 304 
of the Clean Air Act, some courts have denied standing to certain 
plaintiffs bringing citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. 270 Some of 
the cases resolved on standing grounds have involved actions 
brought under section 304.271 Others have been decided in the con-
text of suits brought under section 307 of the Act,272 a section that 
266 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 93, 
§ 3531.13, at 73 (notes that question of whether Congress broadened categories of legal rights 
in passage of statute is one of legislative intent). 
267 Because the citizen suit provision was addressed primarily in terms of its beneficial effect 
on federal enforcement (see supra notes 247-62 and accompanying text) this interpretation is 
more reasonable. 
268 A congressional intent to confer standing on a class of private attorneys general is not 
per se valid in article III terms. See infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
269 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,700 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (section 304 represents a congressional desire to widen citizen access to courts, but not 
to fling courts' doors "wide open"). 
270 See infra notes 278-98 and accompanying text. 
271 See infra notes 300-05 and accompanying text. 
272 Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1982) [hereinafter Section 307]. This 
provision would likely be invoked to challenge administrative decisions of the type discussed 
at supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Section 307(b)(I) provides: 
(b)Judicial Review 
(1) A petition for review of an action of the Administrator in promulgating any 
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard 
or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or 
requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under section 7521 of this 
title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 7521(b)(I) of this 
title), any determination under section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohib-
ition under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of this title, 
any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any 
other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the 
Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United States Court of 
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for the purposes of this Comment is treated as embodying the same 
policy considerations and embracing the same cases as does section 
304.273 
A number of cases have been decided in suits brought under 
section 505, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.274 The 
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision is substantially similar and 
parallel to section 304, and cases decided under section 505 are 
therefore instructive as to the validity of section 304.275 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's 
action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 7410 of 
this title or section 7411(d) of this title, any order under section 7411(j) of this title, 
under section 7412(c) of this title, under section 7413(d) of this title, under section 
7419 of this title, or under section 7420 of this title, or his action under section 1857c-
1O(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect before August 7, 1977) or under 
regulations thereunder, or any other final action of the Administrator under this 
chapter (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter 
I of this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the 
preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence 
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in 
taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on 
such a determination. Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed 
within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval or action 
appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds 
arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection 
shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise. 
[d., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
273 This position is by no means unanimous among circuit courts. See, e.g., Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (1st Cir. 1973) (a section 307 petition 
for review is regarded as an action under section 304(a»; see also Roosevelt Campobello 
International Park Commission v. EPA, 711 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1983). Roosevelt Campo-
bello involved a petition for review under the Clean Water Act, which the court deemed 
pursuant to that statute's citizen suit provision. 711 F.2d at 434. Also, in reference to the 
CAA, "any citizen" standing of section 304(a) deemed applicable to both sections 304 and 307. 
[d.; but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (concludes that sections 304 and 307 contemplate distinct types of actions). The First 
Circuit believes that its analysis in the 1973 NRDC case was confirmed by Congress' passage 
of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977, in which § 305(0 expressly adopts a fee award 
provision with result that no substantive distinctions can be drawn between sections 304 and 
307 for the purpose of denying § 307 petitioners attorney's fees, as the D.C. Circuit had done. 
Roosevelt Campobello, 711 F.2d at 436. One commentator has labelled the First Circuit's 
approach "highly creative" but ultimately unconvincing. CURRIE, supra note 91, § 9.18. In 
this view, section 304's antecedents in the common law writ of mandamus substantively 
distinguish it from section 307. [d. 
274 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
275 There is much case law supporting an analogy between § 304 of the CAA and § 505 of 
the CWA. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass., 
453 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.27 (1981) (CWA provision "expressly modelled" after CAA provision); 
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 383-84 (1987) (explicit connection 
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A. NRDC I, NRDC II and Mountain States: Standing Denied in 
Section 307 Suits 
Three courts have denied standing to plaintiffs suing under section 
307 of the Clean Air Act.276 Each court was faced with the issue of 
whether "any person" may file a section 307 suit. 277 The courts were 
also required to decide if standing to sue under section 307 was 
defined by the "any person" language of section 304, or by the 
"adversely affected or aggrieved" language of the Administrative 
Procedure Act's analogue to section 307. 278 The holdings in each case 
demonstrate a reluctance to permit universal standing under the 
Clean Air Act, despite the likelihood that sections 304 and 307 con-
template the same types of cases. 279 Dicta in all three cases suggest 
that if each court were called upon to rule directly on the plaintiff's 
standing in a section 304 suit,28O the result would not have been any 
different. 281 
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,282 Judge Breiten-
stein noted that section 307, like section 304, does not contain the 
familiar "adversely affected or aggrieved" language which limits 
standing in suits brought under the AP A.283 He refused, however, 
to rely on standing as defined in section 304.284 Instead Judge Brei-
tenstein chose to deny the NRDC standing to challenge the EPA's 
between the two provisions); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 
701 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citizen suit provisions alike in most respects save wording of standing 
grant); Roosevelt Campobello, 711 F.2d at 434 (two provisions "almost identically worded" 
and "parallel"). 
276 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973); Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); Mountain States Legal 
Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980). 
277 Section 307, supra note 272. This section does not set forth the requirements for standing 
to file such a petition. I d. 
278 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). This section provides for judicial 
review of a type similar to that provided for in section 307. Id. However, the APA limits the 
right to file a petition for review to those persons "suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute .... " Id. 
279 See supra note 273. 
280 If, in other words, an action to compel the Administrator to perform a non-discretionary 
act, rather than a petition for review of the validity of the Administrator's actions, had been 
filed. 
281 This, in tum, suggests an unwillingness to hear challenges to government conduct in any 
instance where the plaintiff has not been injured in fact. 
282 481 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973). 
283 Id. at 118-19 (noting that judicial review provision does not provide any guidance as to 
who may file such a petition). 
284 I d. at 120. 
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decision to approve the air quality implementation plans submitted 
by three western states.285 The court found "no allegation of harm 
to any individual, to any organization, or to any member of any 
organization. "286 The court provided the following obiter discussion 
of the desirability of standing absent injury in fact: 
From a practical standpoint, it seems unreasonable to inter-
pret [section 307] as expressing a congressional intent to permit 
aNew York subway rider to challenge in the . . . Tenth Circuit 
actions of the Administrator affecting the Four Corners area 
.... If such be the intent of Congress, let it say so explicitly 
.... We have [in section 307] a blanket authorization, nothing 
more .... We believe that any congressional authorization of 
suits by private attorney generals [sic] must be unequivocal and 
appropriate. We further believe that under the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers the question of the validity and extent [of] 
congressional authorization is for determination by the judicial 
branch. 287 
This can properly be interpreted as a condemnation of universal 
standing to bring suits challenging governmental conduct. 
The Ninth Circuit later reached a similar result in a section 307 
case, again called National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
EPA.288 As in the first NRDC case, the NRDC II court addressed 
the practicability of a statute expressly abrogating the injury in fact 
standing requirement: 
The court [in NRDC I] refused to read into Section 307(b)(1) of 
the Act . . . a standing requirement more liberal than that ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in other cases in which standing to 
sue was predicated upon a specific statutory authorization. We 
agree with this construction . . . . Given the inexorable inter-
relationship between standing and the constitutional prerequi-
sites of federal jurisdiction under Article III . . . we are unable 
to accept the NRDC's contention that the statute could confer 
standing without a prior showing of "injury in fact. "289 
Again, as in NRDC I, the court's dicta rejects the notion that uni-
versal standing under any provision, whether express or implied, is 
valid as a matter of constitutional law. 290 
285 Id. at 117. 
!86 Id. at 118. 
287 I d. at 120. 
288 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974). 
289Id. at 909 (citations omitted). 
290 The court's analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's view of Congress's power to 
expand standing. See supra notes 196-224 and accompanying text. 
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The NRDC II court concluded that the environmental group 
lacked standing to challenge the EPA's approval of Arizona's pro-
posed air quality implementation plan. 291 Specifically, the court saw 
no evidence that the NRDC, as a corporation,suffered an injury to 
its "corporate health" as a result of breathing Arizona's air.292 Be-
cause the NRDC was an "artificial entity separate and apart from 
its membership,"293 the requisite elements of organizational standing 
were found lacking. 294 
In Mountain States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Costle295 the Tenth 
Circuit was called upon to rule on the standing of an environmental 
organization to bring a section 307 suit against the EPA for issuing 
approval of the air quality implementation program submitted by 
Colorado.296 The court held that Mountain States did not have stand-
ing to sue on its own behalf because it failed to show that imple-
mentation of Colorado's proposal would impair its activities as an 
organization. 297 Citing NRDC I for support, the Mountain States 
court ruled that, notwithstanding section 307's apparently unlimited 
standing definition, the "adversely affected or aggrieved" language 
of the AP A controlled. 298 The court further ruled that article III 
requires, in all events, that a plaintiff show injury in fact. 299 
B. Metropolitan Washington: Section 30.4 Upheld as a Valid 
Grant of Universal Standing 
One case decided by the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals stands 
alone in its support of section 304 as a valid grant of universal 
standing: Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. Dis-
trict of Columbia. 300 In Metropolitan Washington the court ruled on 
the standing of a citizens group to bring a section 304 suit challenging 
the operation of a municipally-owned incinerator that was allegedly 
in violation of the District's promulgated emissions standards. 301 
291 507 F.2d at 910. 
292 [d. 
293 [d. at 910 n.6. 
294 [d. 
295 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980). 
296 [d. at 757. 
297 [d. at 767. 
298 [d. 
299 [d. 
300 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
301 [d. at 810-11. 
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The court held that in the context of a CAA citizen suit, "[t]he 
standing argument presents no barrier to plaintiffs' action. "302 The 
court heralded the citizen suit provision as a means of encouraging 
citizen participation in pollution control enforcement "in the face of 
official inaction. "303 The M etropol itan Washington court went on to 
hold that Congress may grant standing to whomever it wishes , 304 
thus overruling the trial court's determination that section 304 is not 
valid as a grant of universal standing. 305 
The circuit court's holding, though facially inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's view of Congress's power to expand standing,306 
was made in the context of a discrete, observable violation of stan-
dards promulgated under the Act. 307 The existence of a justiciable 
controversy in this instance could not be challenged.308 However, the 
court's language unequivocally supports section 304 as a valid grant 
of universal standing in any context, whether the challenged action 
be that of the EPA administrator or of an industrial violator. 309 
The Metropolitan Washington court seems to have focused on the 
congressional intent underlying section 304-an intent to confer 
standing on an unlimited class of private attorneys general to "invoke 
the judicial process and assert the public interest. "310 Some support 
for the proposition that a congressional intent to provide citizen 
standing in the furtherance of a statutory scheme is a valid basis for 
302 [d. at 814. 
303 [d. This analysis squares with Congress' purpose for enacting section 304. See supra 
notes 248-262 and accompanying text. This rationale has been cited in support of universal 
standing in CAA citizen suits in at least one other case. See Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973) (standing in suits brought under 
sections 304 or 307 should be allowed to plaintiffs who are not "aggrieved" in light of fact that 
Congress felt such suits would be invaluable mechanism for enforcement of CAA). 
304 Metropolitan Washington, 511 F.2d at 814 n.26. 
305 Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 373 F. Supp. 
1089, 1092 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
306 See supra notes 196-232 and accompanying text. 
307 Metropolitan Washington, 511 F.2d at 810 (appellants charged that municipally owned 
incinerator was not being operated in accordance with District of Columbia's air quality 
implementation plan). 
308 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (existence of otherwise justiciable contro-
versy suggests prudential barrier is at issue). 
309 Metropolitan Washington, 511 F.2d at 814 ("Under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit 
provision, the general requirements for standing have been relaxed to permit suits by 'any 
citizen."') Hence, it seems that the court would not have credited an argument that the act 
unconstitutionally opens the court's doors to "political questions." See supra notes 49-52 and 
accompanying text. The court does, however, indicate that it is consciously making this 
statement in the context of an "otherwise" justiciable controversy. 511 F.2d at 814 n.26. 
310 Metropolitan Washington, 511 F.2d at 814; accord Duquesne Light Company v. EPA, 
698 F.2d 456, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citizens welcome to vindicate their environmental interests). 
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a liberal standing analysis can be found in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO.3ll 
In Trafficante, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the stand-
ing of two white plaintiffs, residents of an apartment complex from 
which black tenants had allegedly been excluded, under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.312 The plaintiffs claimed that they had been 
denied the privileges and advantages that attach to life in an inte-
grated community. 313 
The Trafficante Court endeavored to determine whether the plain-
tiffs were injured within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.314 The 
Court looked at the legislative history of the Act and determined 
that Congress felt that even those who were not direct victims 
suffered from racial discrimination. 315 The Court's inquiry, however, 
was not whether these plaintiffs had suffered injury in fact, for they 
had plainly alleged facts sufficient for standing in the article III 
sense.316 
Instead the Trafficante inquiry was confined to the question of 
whether this statute authorized these plaintiffs to bring suit. 317 The 
Court supported its affirmative conclusion to this question with ref-
erence to the fact that the Act delegated no enforcement power to 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 318 The govern-
ment's inability to adequately enforce the statute led the Court to 
conclude that "the main generating force must be private suits in 
which ... the complainants act not only in their own behalf but also 
'as private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered to be of the highest priority. "'319 This perceived need for 
the active participation of citizens in the enforcement of the Act 
persuaded the Court to give a "generous construction" to standing 
under the Act's citizen suit provision. 320 
While the Trafficante decision is careful to permit this broad con-
struction only within the parameters of article III,321 it does intimate 
311 409 u.s. 205 (1972). 
312Id. at 208 (suit was brought under section 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. § 361O(a». 
313Id. 
314Id. at 210-12. 
315Id. at 210. 
316Id. at 211. 
317Id. at 210-12. 
318Id. at 210. 
319Id. at 211. 
32°Id. at 212. 
321 See id. at 211. The Court noted that because the plaintiff has alleged U[iJnjury ... with 
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that the resolution of standing questions may be influenced by a 
congressional intent to involve citizens in the enforcement of an 
important statutory scheme.322 Support for this proposition in other 
cases is limited. 323 
C. Standing Under Section 505 of the Clean Water Act: "Clearer" 
Language Does Not Preempt the Standing Question 
When Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act324 
in 1972, it included a citizen suit provision325 patterned after that 
found in the CAA.326 The two sections, section 505 of the Clean 
Water Act ("CWA") and section 304 of the CAA, are alike in most 
respects, except with regard to standing. 327 
The legislative history of the passage of section 505 is instructive 
as to how Congress reacted in the wake of the standing doctrine 
enunciated in Sierra v. Morton. 328 Section 505, in accordance with 
the Sierra holding, limits standing to those "persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected."329 
The Senate had proposed that section 505 enable "anyone" to 
sue. 330 The House took a more restricted view, one well within 
particularity ... there is not present the abstract question problem raising problems under 
Art. III of the Constitution." Id. 
322 Id. at 210-12. 
323 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971), in which the Court seemed to place 
the role of the private attorney general outside the reasoning of the injury in fact requirement. 
Id. at 737--38. The private attorney general, according to the Sierra Court, must first meet 
the threshold standing test of injury in fact. Id. Once judicial review is "properly invoked," 
the plaintiff, as private attorney general, may proceed as a "representative of the public 
interest." Id. at 737. But see McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265,269 (D. Idaho), aff'd memo 
sub nom. McClure V. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981) (intimates that it may be possible for 
injury in fact requirement to be dispensed when statute permits actions enforcing the public 
interest). 
324 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
325Id. § 1365 [section 505]. 
326 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). See also supra note 275. 
327 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (citizen suit provisions in CAA and CWA alike in most respects, save in respect to 
standing grants). 
328 See Miller, supra note 93, at 10,316; see also Sierra Club V. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 
104 (2d Cir. 1984) (legislative history of Clean Water Act citizen suit provision shows that 
Congress intended these provisions to confer standing in compliance with the principles set 
out in then-recent Supreme Court decision of Sierra V. Morton). 
329 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) [hereinafter Section 505(g)]. 
330 S. CONF. REP. No. 1263, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 3823. 
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constitutional standing limits, by suggesting that suits be limited to 
those persons "directly affected" by violations of the Act. 331 
The conferees arrived at a result that was consistent with Sierra's 
holding332 and that struck a compromise between the Senate's desire 
to seek public enforcement of the Act and the House's desire to limit 
suits under the Act to those unequivocally injured. 333 The Conference 
Committee's proposal, which became the enacted bill, limited stand-
ing to those persons who have suffered injury in fact. 334 
Despite the pains taken while drafting section 505 to avoid the 
constitutional problems inherent in section 304, the section has been 
subjected to an interpretation denying standing to a party who 
seemed to be aggrieved within the plain meaning of the Act. 335 In 
this case, Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
standing to a corporate intervenor in a section 505 suit.336 In Judge 
Bork's view, the corporation could not conceivably suffer an aesthetic 
injury within the meaning of the Act.337 This holding was issued 
despite the fact that the corporation seemed eligible for standing 
under the wording of the CWA, and, moreover, seemed to have met 
the injury in fact test. 338 
Several years earlier, in an opinion by Judge (now Justice) Ken-
nedy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the standing of a 
citizen to bring a section 505 suit challenging the expenditure of EPA 
grant money for projects allegedly unrelated to water pollution. 339 
The court interpreted the legislative history of section 505 to indicate 
that the section was "intended to grant standing to a nationwide 
331 [d. 
332 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1972, Vol. I, ch. III, 221 (1973). The colloquy between Senators Bayh and Muskie reveals a 
belief that the extension of judicially cognizable injuries to include aesthetic interests an-
nounced in Sierra (see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text) made a mere interest in a 
problem sufficient to confer standing. [d. This is an apparent misreading of Sierra, which 
forcefully holds that a mere interest in a problem is not tantamount to injury in fact. Sierra 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1971). 
333 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46. 
334 Section 505(g), supra note 329. 
335 Citizens Coordinating Committee on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metropol-
itan Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir.1985). 
336 [d. at 1173. 
337 [d. (corporate plaintiff held not capable of suffering from aesthetic injury resulting from 
seepage of foul-smelling, contaminated water into basement of corporation's mall). 
338 Section 505, supra note 325. This section is preceded by a general definitional section, 
33 U.S.C. § 1362, which defines "person" as including corporations. [d. § 1362(5). 
339 Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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class, comprised of citizens who alleged an interest in clean water. "340 
Thus, the court viewed section 505 as giving "every citizen a litigable 
interest" in enforcement of the CW A. 341 Although the court dis-
missed the case on standing grounds because the relief requested 
would not redress the injuries claimed,342 its reading of section 505 
may take the provision well outside constitutional limits. 343 Judge 
Bork's ruling344 limits standing under section 505 to something less 
than the constitutionally permissible extent. 
VII. ANALYSIS 
The constitutional validity of Congress's creation of universal 
standing in section 304 of the Clean Air Act is of considerable doubt. 
The questionable validity of section 304 applies as well to other 
citizen suit provisions containing univeral standing grants. 345 In light 
of both the importance of citizen suits in the enforcement of federal 
environmentallegislation346 and of the revitalization of standing as a 
barrier to access to the federal courts,347 the question of whether 
grants of universal standing guarantee the participation of interested 
citizen groups in environmental litigation merits consideration. 
340 I d. at 1266. 
341Id. (emphasis added). This is a surprisingly broad reading of Congress' power to create 
judicially cognizable rights. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
342 Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1267. This means of dismissing the case on standing grounds may 
have been a way for Judge Kennedy to label the cause a "political question." See supra notes 
49-52 and accompanying text. He found that the challenged expenditure was a wrong that 
could not be redressed by any "judicial decree properly issued." 688 F.2d at 1268. Because no 
evidence was adduced that more grants were forthcoming, the court was not in a position to 
award any meaningful prospective relief. Id. 
343 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1971). The proposition that standing is granted 
in § 505 to all citizens with an "interest" in water pollution law enforcement conflicts with the 
Sierra Court's insistence that a "mere interest" in a problem is not a sufficient basis for 
standing. Id. 
344 See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra note 11. 
346 See supra note 93. 
347 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. Older cases, including SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
669 (1972), intimate that the standing barrier may become more formidable at any stage 
subsequent to the filing of a complaint. See, e.g., id. at 689 n.15 (if, upon consideration of 
motion for summary judgment, it became clear that plaintiff's allegations were a "sham ... 
rais[ing] no genuine issue fact" then the case would properly be dismissed for want of injury 
to plaintiff). For recent affirmation of this proposition, see Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 385 (1987). See also National Wildlife Fed'n. v. Burford, 
835 F.2d 305, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (degree of specificity required in plaintiff's allegation 
of injury increases proportionally as case moves from motion to dismiss to motion for summary 
judgment); accord Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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It is undoubtedly a legitimate exercise of its legislative power for 
Congress to create rights and extend standing to new classes of 
plaintiffs. 348 There is a limit, however, to Congress's ability to create 
rights, the invasion of which constitutes the injury necessary for a 
plaintiff to have standing. This limit, though as inchoately drawn as 
the standing doctrine itself, is discernible in the nature of a "general" 
or "abstract" injury. 349 
The extent of Congress's power to grant standing is often char-
acterized as limited to the abrogation of "prudential" barriers to 
standing. 350 Normally, prudential considerations render "general 
grievances" an inadequate basis upon which to predicate standing. 351 
However, because the boundary between the prudential and the 
constitutional is inherently so indistinct,352 this oft-stated rule of 
limitation is of little utility in determining the validity of express 
statutory standing grants. 
Justice Scalia has written that there is a limit to "the power of 
Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights . . . . "353 
The theme of "generalized benefit," "generalized grievance," and 
"abstract" injury is often heard in reference to lawsuits challenging 
the conduct of government. 354 There are few rights more generalized 
in a democracy than the right to legitimate governmental conduct. 
But, the invasion of that right is, in some instances, no substitute 
for the "particular concrete injury"355 necessary for article III stand-
ing.356 
It is tempting to assert that section 304 of the Clean Air Act is 
facially invalid because it purports to grant standing to parties who 
are not injured in fact.357 This facile answer to the question of section 
304's validity overlooks Congress's power to create legally cognizable 
rights.358 The question of whether Congress intended in section 304 
348 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
349 See supra notes 212-32 and accompanying text. 
350 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. 
351 See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. 
352 See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text. 
353 Scalia, supra note 76, at 886. 
354 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1973) 
(challenge to enlistment of members of Congress in armed services reserves based on a general 
and abstract grievance). 
355 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1973). 
356 See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text. 
357 See supra note 144 and accompanying text, noting that Congress may not abrogate the 
article III injury in fact requirement. 
358 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
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to create a legally cognizable right can be resolved only with refer-
ence to the legislative history of the Clean Air Act.359 The legislative 
history of section 304 reveals a general intent to engage citizens in 
the enforcement of the Act. 360 This general intent can be broken 
down into three specific objectives. 
One objective was to "goad"361 or "motivate"362 agencies to enforce 
the Act more diligently. This rationale for citizen suits-the desire 
to motivate government agencies-would probably not withstand an 
argument that it serves a political function and is therefore not a 
proper reason for invoking judicial intervention. 363 
The second objective was that of involving citizens in policy-set-
ting. 364 This, too, although a proper goal of citizen participation in 
the formulation and implementation of regulatory schemes,365 argu-
ably serves a political function. 366 The supervision of citizen involve-
ment in policy-setting is a legislative or administrative, not judicial, 
task. 367 
The third objective was to invoke the aid of citizens, as private 
attorneys general, in the enforcement of the Act against violators. 368 
This objective, formulated in light of the perceived inadequacy of 
agency enforcement mechanisms,369 is, as a matter of constitutional 
law, invalid as a basis for citizen standing if it enables what are 
purely qui tam actions.37o Provided, however, that each plaintiff 
bringing suit under the Act meets the injury in fact requirement, 
reliance on citizens to assist in enforcement is constitutionally per-
359 See supra notes 237-69 and accompanying text. 
360 See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
361 Miller, supra note 93, at 10310. 
362 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
365 The APA provides for public participation in agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) 
provides that agencies "shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in . . . 
rulemaking . . . ." 
366 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
367Id. The natural extension of this argument is that citizen suits against an agency bring 
into a judicial forum issues that the AP A provides can be resolved elsewhere. See supra notes 
231, 365. Citizen suits have predominantly been initiated against agencies, or government in 
general. See Miller, supra note 93, at 10,313 (noting that the "most celebrated uses [of citizen 
suits] have been against EPA for its failures to implement the environmental statutes in a 
timely and complete manner"). 
366 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
369Id. 
370 See supra note 93. 
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missible. 371 In this respect, Congress's power to grant every citizen 
a legal right to clean air cannot legitimately be questioned. 372 
Once the power of Congress to create judicially cognizable rights 
is properly accounted for, it becomes clear that section 304 is invalid 
in so far as it allows certain types of actions against the govern-
ment. 373 The objectives underlying the provision are particularly 
suspect when they reveal that the provision was designed to enable 
citizen actions to challenge agency decisions. 374 An action against the 
Administrator of the EPA for, say, authorizing the issuance of a 
permit375 presents what is arguably a "political question. "376 Since 
the issuance of a permit, however, usually affects a discrete group 
of people in a distinct fashion,377 the effects of the permit are a 
legitimate source of a justiciable controversy. 378 
If, however, the challenged action is of regional or national impact, 
as in the case of the Administrator's supervision of air quality im-
plementation plans,379 the spectre of a political question looms larger. 
371 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1971) (once plaintiffs have shown injury in 
fact, they may proceed to act as private attorneys general). 
372 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. If the standing inquiry were limited to 
whether a plaintiff falls within a "zone of interests" created by a statute, then it would be 
beyond peradventure that every citizen is legitimately interested in clean air and would 
thereby be entitled to bring suit under section 304. The "zone of interests" test for statutory 
standing established in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 153 (1970), however, has remained an "amorphous and unrefined concept" of little 
utility in answering vexing standing questions. See Comment, supra note 183, at 140-41. 
373 The same conclusion is applicable to section 307 insofar as standing under section 307 is 
considered unlimited. See supra note 273. 
374 See supra notes 359-70 and accompanying text. Suits against agency action were envi-
sioned in all three objectives revealed in the legislative history, with the exception of that 
which contemplated citizen participation in enforcing the statute against violators of the Act. 
Id. 
375 See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 824 (1978) (suit pursuant to Clean Water Act's administrative review provision, 
seeking review of EPA's decision to issue permit to nuclear plant for emission of hot water 
into bay). 
376 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
377 See, e.g., Seacoast, 572 F.2d 872 (residents of area surrounding nuclear power plant 
alleged that they would suffer negative consequences of Administrator's decision to issue 
permit). 
378 See supra notes 36-37, 141 and accompanying text. Therefore, the barrier to standing 
in the absence of a statute is prudential, and may be abrogated. 
379 See, e.g., Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (challenge to EPA 
Administrator's failure to issue implementation plan modification orders to states pursuant to 
finding of acid rain deposition problem), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). See also supra 
notes 6-7 and accompanying text (EPA and Congress customarily extend schedules for com-
pliance with SIP's). 
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The more general a grievance becomes, the more abstract it seems 
to a court.380 At this point, the plaintiff is presenting a political 
question that could better be resolved in a representative forum. 381 
At this point, the court is forced to perform a function inconsistent 
with its usual role,382 and separation of powers concerns become 
legitimate. 383 
Separation of powers concerns therefore interpose a formidable 
barrier between section 304 and constitutional legitimacy. If section 
304 were limited in application to the initiation of suits against 
violators or potential violators of the Clean Air Act, then standing 
could legitimately be granted to "any person. "384 This is because 
suits against violators involve what are otherwise justiciable contro-
versies; in the absence of section 304, the standing barrier is purely 
prudential. 385 
Section 304, however, as it currently exists, authorizes suits by 
"any person" against the Administrator of the EPA for failure to 
perform non-discretionary acts. 386 When the putatively "non-discre-
tionary" act is an act of regional, national, or even internationaP87 
significance, the plaintiff presents a "political question" beyond the 
scope of an article III court's power to resolve. 388 
Section 304389 therefore is invalid as a grant of universal standing 
insofar as it permits suits against the government for actions of 
regional or national significance. In respect to suits against viola-
tors,390 plaintiffs can establish standing by alleging that the defen-
dant has violated the Clean Air Act in some way. In either case-
suits against the government or suits against the violator-section 
304 does not operate by displacing the injury in fact requirement. 391 
380 See supra notes 212--32 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. 
383 See supra notes 48-54; see also notes 92-116 and accompanying text. 
384 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). If the provision were limited in scope to the wording of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(a)(I) and (a)(3), then it would authorize only suits against actual or potential violators 
of the Clean Air Act. 
385 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Assuming that allegations against a 
violator are valid, the existence of a justiciable controversy is not questioned. 
386 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). 
387 See, e.g., Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (failure of Administrator 
to take steps to halt acid rain deposition had trans-boundary implications), cert. denied, 107 
S. Ct. 3196 (1987). 
388 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
389 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). 
390 42 U. S. C. § 7604(a)(I), (2). 
391 See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. The requirement may not be displaced, 
congressionally or otherwise. 
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In cases against violators, however, the requisite injury is always 
to be found in the mere fact that the statute has been violated. In 
cases against the government, however, case by case inquiry into 
whether a general political question is presented is necessary to 
determine the existence of injury in fact. 
Courts faced with a Clean Air Act citizen suit in which the plaintiff 
alleges a general or abstract grievance should adhere to the policy 
of avoiding declaring a statute unconstitutional. 392 Instead of ruling 
that section 304 and other citizen suit provisions are unconstitutional 
insofar as they grant standing regardless of a plaintiff's ability to 
show injury in fact, courts should follow the example set by the 
Supreme Court in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany.393 The Trafficante Court held that when a legislative intent to 
confer standing on a broad class of citizen enforcers is discernible, 
courts should resolve the standing issue liberally. 394 
Courts resolving the standing issue in the context of section 304 
suits, however, cannot grant standing as liberally as a literal reading 
of the statute would suggest. Rather, the issue should be resolved 
with reference to the Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review 
provision. 395 Such a rule of construction would limit standing in 
section 304 cases to only those plaintiffs adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action. 396 This would allow for liberal standing 
grants as envisioned by the Trafficante Court without posing a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of section 304. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The universal grant of standing contained in the Clean Air Act's 
citizen suit provision was designed to provide for the participation 
of interested citizens in the enforcement of the Act. The suscepti-
bility of government agencies-whether dependent or independent 
of direct executive control-to political pressures renders agency 
diligence in the enforcement process both inconstant and unpredict-
able. 
A citizen suit provision with a grant of universal standing cannot 
be legitimized solely because it reflects political reality. Although 
392 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1935) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (Supreme Court will avoid holding statutes unconstitutional). 
393 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 311-23 and accompanying text. 
394 Tmjjicante, 409 U.S. at 212. 
395 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
396 [d. 
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the validity of the standing doctrine as a necessary corollary to the 
case and controversy clause and as a necessary function of the sep-
aration of powers may be questioned, the vitality of the doctrine is 
beyond doubt. As organizational or individual plaintiffs in a citizen 
suit allege increasingly generalized and abstract injuries, they 
threaten to cross the line that separates justiciable controversies 
from political questions. The universal standing grants in section 304 
of the Clean Air Act and in other federal environmental statutes do 
not guarantee that this line will not be crossed. 
